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Climate change presents a challenge to the fishing industry and managers alike. Changing
environmental conditions affect fish location, abundance, and ecosystem relationships, which can
result in dramatic shifts in economically important stocks. These shifts can stress management
systems as well as the fishermen who depend on effective management.
Climate-influenced changes present both challenges and opportunities. For example, New England
cod stocks have dramatically declined in recent years—a trend attributed to rapid increases in ocean
temperatures in the Gulf of Maine, combined with a management failure to account for those
changes when setting quotas.1 The result was declaration of a federal disaster in 2012, reflecting the
extreme hardships that the required cuts to quota imposed on industry.2 On the other hand, warmwater species such as black sea bass have expanded their distribution northward, providing new
fishing opportunities to fishermen in these areas.
Effective and adaptive fisheries management systems are needed both to avoid economic and
environmental dislocation associated with climate-driven changes in fish stocks and to enable the
industry to take advantage of new opportunities. The legal literature has considered how frameworks
can be designed to adapt to climate change in a variety of regulatory contexts. This article applies
these legal theories of adaptive management to fisheries management systems in the U.S. In Part I,
the article reviews the U.S. fishery management system, including federal, regional, and state
management. Part II evaluates fisheries management legal frameworks against each of four adaptive
management frameworks identified in the legal literature in order to identify where and how fisheries
law enables or undermines resilience. In part III, this analysis is applied to a specific fishery—black
sea bass—to illustrate how these insights are applied in practice. Part IV concludes that close
consideration of specific procedural and substantive aspects of fisheries legal frameworks and
Marianne Lavelle, Collapse of New England’s Iconic Cod Tied to Climate Change, SCIENCE,
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/10/collapse-new-england-s-iconic-cod-tied-climate-change .
2 See Groundfish Disaster Economic Assistance Program, MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFF.,
http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/dfg/dmf/programs-and-projects/groundfish-disaster-economic-assistanceprogram.html (last visited Sep. 7, 2017).
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individual fisheries is needed to understand whether and how they enable adaptive management in
the face of environmental change.
1

The U.S. Fisheries Management System

U.S. fisheries management is a complex system that includes separate federal, regional, and state
frameworks that work together to govern fishing in state and federal waters. This section provides
an overview of these management systems and how they interact in practice.
Federal Fisheries Management: The Magnuson Stevens Act
Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, also known as
the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), in 1976 to regulate fishing in U.S. federal waters. The MSA is the
primary statute governing marine fisheries from the seaward boundary of the territorial sea to the
seaward extent of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 200 nautical miles from shore.3
The MSA delegates responsibility for fisheries management in these waters to eight regional fishery
management councils (FMCs). Each FMC is made up of members from each state in the region and
from the regional office of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).4 In addition to the voting
members, each council has four non-voting members who represent the United States Coast Guard,
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of State, and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission (ASMFC).5
FMCs manage fisheries under their jurisdiction by establishing a fishery management plan (FMP)
“for each fishery under its authority that requires conservation and management.”6 Once a FMP is
complete and approved by the Council in compliance with the Act, NMFS issues regulations to
implement the FMP.7 FMPs must contain mandatory elements and may contain discretionary
elements, and they must be consistent with ten national standards set out in the Act.8 The
mandatory elements include assessment of “the present and probable future condition” of the
fishery, as well as its optimum yield, maximum sustainable yield, and “objective and measurable
criteria” for determining when a stock is overfished.9 Each FMC must establish annual catch limits
for the fishery based on a mechanism that must be set out in the FMP.10 If NMFS determines that a
stock is overfished according to the criteria in a FMP, the FMC must amend the FMP to include
16 U.S.C. §§ 1802 (defining EEZ); 1811(a) (declaring sovereign authority over fishing); 1853 (authorizing permits for
fishing as element of FMPs).
4 Id. §§ 1801(b)(5); 1852.
5 Id.
6 Id. § 1852(h)(1).
7 16 U.S.C. § 1854.
8 Id. §§ 1851 (national standards), 1853 (contents of FMPs).
9 16 U.S.C. § 1853.
10 Id. §§ 1852(h)(6) (requiring Council to set annual catch limits); 1853(a)(15) (requiring annual catch limit mechanism in
FMPs).
3
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measures sufficient to rebuild the stock within the shortest period possible, generally not to exceed
10 years.11
Status determination criteria and yield thresholds are based on stock assessments conducted by the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), as well as analysis from Council committees and
panels.12 The MSA requires and authorizes FMCs to create committees and panels to support their
work. Each council is required to establish a Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) “to assist it in
the development, collection, evaluation, and peer review of [] statistical, biological, economic, social,
and other scientific information,” including by approval of stock assessments and associated status
determination criteria and yield thresholds for management of stocks under the Council’s
management.13 Annual catch limits “may not exceed the fishing level recommendations” determined
by SSCs.14 FMCs also may establish Advisory Panels, must establish a fishing industry advisory
committee and must establish an advisory committee for any FMP or amendment for a highly
migratory fishery that occurs in more than one region.15
FMCs rely heavily on their committees and panels in carrying out their appointed tasks. For
example, the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) uses Oversight Committees,
Plan Development Teams, and Advisory Committees in addition to its SSC.16 Oversight Committees
include council members and “generally relate[] to a specific fishery or important management
issue.” They develop specific measures for inclusion in an FMP or an amendment or framework
adjustment.17 The Advisory Panels provide the Oversight Committees with advice from stakeholders
throughout the planning processes.18 Plan Development Teams provide the Oversight Committee
with technical support on scientific, legal, and implementation issues.19 These panels and committees
enable the FMC to create and implement FMPs.
Some fisheries do not exist solely in a single fishery management region. The Secretary of
Commerce, through NMFS, is responsible for managing specific highly migratory species (tuna,
marlin, oceanic sharks, sailfishes, and swordfish).20 For other fisheries that “extend beyond the
geographical area of authority of any one Council,” the Secretary may designate which FMC is
responsible for developing the FMP for the fishery or require that multiple FMCs jointly manage the
Id. § 1854(e).
Richard D. Methot, Stock Assessment: Operational Models in Support of Fisheries Management, in THE FUTURE OF
FISHERIES SCIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA 137, 142-44 (R.J. Beamish & B.J. Rothschild, eds., 2009)
13 Id. § 1852(g)(1)(A).
14 Id. § 1852(h)(1).
15 Id. § 1852(g).
16 See, e.g., New England FMC, History and Organizational Structure, http://www.nefmc.org/about/history (detailing New
England FMC’s reliance on in conducting its business).
17 Id.
18 Id. (stating that Advisory Panels’ members consist of “…members from the fishing industry, scientists, environmental
advocates, and others with knowledge and experience related to fisheries issues”).
19 Id.
20 Id. §§ 1852(a)(3), 1802(21) (defining highly migratory species)
11
12

3

fishery.21 In the case of joint management, one FMC will be designated the administrative lead for
developing the FMP, but all involved FMCs must approve the resulting FMP before it can take
effect.22
In practice, different fisheries are managed in different ways.23 For example, the Mid-Atlantic FMC
(MAFMC) serves as the sole responsible Council for the management of mackerel, squid, and
butterfish.24 The New England FMC (NEFMC) therefore does not have voting authority on this
FMP, although some of its members participate in management via the MAFMC committee
structure.25 On the other hand, the spiny dogfish FMP is jointly managed by MAFMC and NEFMC,
so both Councils must vote for management to take effect.26
State and Regional Fishery Management: Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission
States retain jurisdiction over fishing in state waters, which in most states extends from shore out to
3 nautical miles.27 States manage fishing for stationary species in their waters independently, but
many stocks migrate or otherwise move across state boundaries. For these species, states have
recognized the need for binding regional management to avoid overfishing.
States have addressed the challenge of regional management by entering into interstate compacts
creating regional fisheries management entities. In 1940, the 15 Atlantic Coast states created the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) by interstate compact in order to support
“the better utilization of fisheries . . . of the Atlantic seaboard.”28 Each state member is represented
on the Commission by 3 commissioners, and each state receives a vote on each issue before the
commission.29
The work of the ASMFC, like FMCs, is substantially supported through associated boards,
commissions, and panels. ASMFC’s fisheries management is conducted pursuant to the Interstate
Fisheries Management Program (ISFMP) charter.30 The ISFMP charter establishes a Policy Board,

16 U.S.C. § 1854(f).
50 C.F.R. § 600.111.
23 See generally MAFMC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COUNCIL MANAGEMENT COORDINATION (Oct. 11, 2007).
24 Telephone Interview with Jason Didden, Fishery Management Specialist, MAFMC (Aug. 22, 2019).
25 Id.
26 Id.; see also MAFMC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COUNCIL MANAGEMENT COORDINATION 11 (Oct. 11, 2007)
(discussing joint management between MAFMC and NEFMC).
27 Id. § 1856 (state jurisdiction).
28 ATLANTIC STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMPACT at preface, Pub. L. No. 539, 56 Stat. 267, 1 (1950).
29 Id. at art. III (commissioners); ASMFC COMPACT RULES AND REGULATIONS art III § 2 (voting).
30 ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM CHARTER § 1 (2016) (citing ASMFC COMPACT RULES
AND REGULATIONS, at art. IV.).
21
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Species Management Boards, and additional committees and teams for technical and advisory
support (Fig. 1).31
•
•

•

The ISFMP Policy Board includes all of the commissioners32 and is responsible for
administration and management of the Commission.33
Species Management Boards are responsible for creating and implementing FMPs and are
made up of Commissioners from the states that have “declared an interest in the species’
management program.”34
Technical Committees, Plan Review Teams, and Advisory Panels support each of the
Species Management Boards.

Figure 1. ASMFC Structure.

Atlantic regional fisheries management operates through “coastal FMPs” designed to prevent
overfishing and maintain sustainable stocks of fish through scientifically-based management
measures.35 The standards and procedures for coastal FMPs are set forth in the ISFMP Charter, in
accordance with requirements established by Congress in the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative
Management Act (ACFCMA), which provides guidance for coastal FMPs, federal-regional
coordination, and state implementation of coastal FMPs.36

Id. §§ 3-5.
Id. (“The ISFMP Policy Board is comprised of the Commissioners from the fifteen member states and representatives
of the District of Columbia (DC), the Potomac River Fisheries Commission (“PRFC”), NOAA Fisheries and the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service. It meets at least bi-annually to establish and monitor the program.”)
33 ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM CHARTER, Preface, (2016),
https://www.asmfc.org/files/pub/ISFMPCharter_Feb2016.pdf.
34 Id. § 4(a).
35 Id. § 6.
36 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5108.
31
32
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The Act requires ASMFC to consult with the appropriate FMC when developing a coastal FMP for
a stock that is located in both state and federal waters and to seek areas where federal and regional
management can be complementary.37 The Secretary of Commerce can adopt regulations to enforce
these coastal FMPs if no complementary federal FMP exists.38 In addition, the federal government
must support and cooperate with ASMFC in interjurisdictional fisheries management, including in
fisheries science and management.39
Among other requirements, coastal FMPs must set out “[a] detailed statement on a state-by-state
basis of each specific regulatory, monitoring, and research requirement that each state must
implement in order to be in compliance with the plan.”40 The ACFCMA in turn requires states to
implement and enforce coastal FMPs.41 Noncompliance with a coastal FMP by a state can result in a
moratorium on fishing in that state42 and, for fisheries that also occur in federal waters, direct federal
regulation of fishing in state waters.43 In practice, these management measures include specification
of allowable catch each year, which may be allocated by region or by state. These state allocations
control how much of a species is available to fishermen in each coastal state, and therefore play a
central role in the ability of the FMP to adapt to changing conditions.
2

Adaptive Management in US Fisheries Legal Frameworks

Fisheries are changing, and fisheries management systems will have to adapt in order to successfully
support sustainable stocks and industry. This section considers whether and how U.S. fishery
management systems are prepared for these changes. This analysis is based on evaluation of fisheries
management under theories of adaptive management developed by legal scholars.
Stationarity or a No-Analogue Future?
Legal systems are often developed based on current and observed historical conditions. To be
effective in the future, however, they must be able to adapt if and when those conditions change.
Stationarity is the idea that “natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of
variability.”44 This “envelope of variability” bounds the higher and lower expected change of a

16 U.S.C. § 5104.
Id. § 5103.
39 Id. § 5103.
40 ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM CHARTER § 6(b) (2016).
41 16 U.S.C. § 5104.
42 Id. § 5106.
43 Id.
44 P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573, 573 (2008); Robin Kundis Craig,
“Stationarity is Dead” -- Long Live Transformation: Five Principles For Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
10, 15-17 (2010).
37
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system throughout a year.45 Stationarity thus allows regulators to design policy for a defined range of
predictable scenarios, which can simplify the task of regulation.
A regulatory system based on stationarity assumptions can work effectively under observed past
conditions but start to break down when conditions violate those assumptions. Climate change is
causing environmental conditions to vary beyond the bounds of the stationarity envelope, resulting
in fluctuations in natural systems that models may not be designed to predict and policies may not
be designed to manage.46 As a result, both scientists and legal scholars now increasingly agree that
stationarity is “dead” as a basis for climate-related regulation.47 Instead, we are entering a “noanalogue future” where climate change is causing unprecedented changes in environmental
conditions, and there is no historical basis for predicting where temperatures, sea levels, weather
patterns, or any number of other factors will stabilize in time.48 Legal frameworks designed for a noanalogue future are not based on defined parameters that serve as boundary conditions, but rather
must assume that changing conditions represent the new normal. This section considers how
fisheries management reflects stationarity and how it may be strained by changing conditions.
U.S. fishery management reflects stationarity in its geographic assumptions. Federal fisheries
management assigns management of fish stocks to a particular, geographically-delimited FMC.49
However, changing ocean conditions may change or expand the range of managed stocks in
unexpected ways. Intercouncil fisheries management tools are available for such situations, but the
experience with joint management has been challenging, especially for states like Rhode Island that
border two fishery management regions but are represented on only one.50 In addition, no formallydefined triggers or other procedural mechanisms are provided for shifting responsibility for stock
management from one council to another should the stocks move or expand their geographic range.
As a result, commentators have noted that this management framework locks management authority
for a given stock into the geographic range of that stock at a certain point in time.51 ASMFC
membership, on the other hand, is inclusive of a wider geographic lens that allows the states
interested in a stock to change over time—a more flexible management framework. As a result,
limits on change in state allocations transition are likely to arise primarily from political forces (e.g.,
historical anchoring) than the structure of the management framework.

Id.
Craig, supra note 44, at 15-16.
47 Craig Anthony Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 KAN. L. REV., 1043, 1052 (2014).
48 J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 394 (2010).
49 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1).
50 MAFMC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COUNCIL MANAGEMENT COORDINATION 34-38 (Oct. 11, 2007) (noting that a
greater proportion of Rhode Island fish landings, both by value and by weight, arise from MAFMC-managed fisheries).
51 Susan E. Farady, Moving Targets: Fisheries Management in New England in the Midst of Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 73, 78 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (noting geographic dispute related to
authority over management of loligo squid).
45
46
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Stock assessments and modeling efforts based on stationarity assumptions may not accurately
capture changes in stocks in a no-analogue future, and they may provide misleading information to
managers.52 As Szuwalski and Hollowed explain, “the tools currently used to manage exploited
populations have shortcomings when applied to stocks for which population processes are changing
over time. If the fisheries management community is going to continue to follow the current
approach to setting harvest controls (i.e. setting management targets for individual species based on
reference fishing mortalities and biomasses), the issue of non-stationarity should be addressed.”53
For example, changing water temperatures may result in stock fluctuations that are not predicted by
stationarity-based fisheries models, resulting in maximum sustainable yield and management
determinations that do not effectively maintain stock biomass at desirable levels.54
Stationarity limitations in fisheries science are indirectly linked to fisheries laws, most notably
through National Standard 2. National Standard 2 requires that conservation and management
measures be based on the best available science.55 This requirement has been the focus of extensive
litigation in disputes over the scientific basis of management decisions, suggesting that NMFS has
wide latitude in using available science, as long as its decisions are grounded in science and
adequately explained.56 As a result, National Standard 2 is unlikely to restrict the use of stationarity
assumptions in annual catch limit determination or rebuilding plans unless and until more accurate
models are available. Once no-analogue future models are available, managers could be required to
deploy them, with potentially unpredictable results on associated decisions, such as annual catch
limits and rebuilding plans and timelines.
Preservationism and Transitionalism in Fisheries Management
Preservationism and transitionalism provide a second lens through which legal scholars have viewed
adaptive management. Preservationist policies adopt a baseline approach “where historical
conditions are used to judge whether management or regulatory standards have been satisfied, or
whether restoration or mitigation goals have been met.”57 Preservationist policies, such as protection
See Cody S. Szuwalski & Anne B. Hollowed, Climate Change and non-stationary population processes in fisheries management, 73
ICES J. MAR. SCI. 1297 (2016) (discussing bias in biomass estimates and management targets resulting from nonstationary processes).
53 Id. at 1301. See also Matthew J. S. Windle et al., Exploring spatial non-stationarity of fisheries survey data using
geographically weighted regression (GWR): an example from the Northwest Atlantic, 67 ICES J. MAR. SCI. 145 (2010) (identifying
improvements to fisheries model by addressing spatial non-stationarity).
54 Id.
55 16 U.S.C. § 1851.
56 See, e.g. Flaherty v. Bryson, 850 F.Supp.2d 38 (D.D.C. 2012) (upholding NMFS acceptable biological catch rule because
it was not required to select plaintiff's preferred model in the absence of contrary data); San Joaquin River Group
Authority v. NMFS, 819 F.Supp.2d 1077 (E.D.Cal.2011) (considering bias corrections in management measures); The
Ocean Conservancy v. Gutierrez, 394 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C.2005) (NMFS justified in considering studies, expert
opinion, and considerations raised by the public in establishing rule).
57 Eric Biber & Josh Eagle, When Does Legal Flexibility Work in Environmental Law?, 42 ECOL. L.Q. 787, 797 (2015)
(“many scholars argue that current environmental and natural resources law relies heavily on a preservationist or baseline
approach,”). Preservationism in this context is distinct from its meaning as an environmental norm for the use of natural
52
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of an area as habitat for a particular species, embody the idea that natural systems can be maintained
in perpetuity in their current condition or returned to a specified prior condition.58 Preservationism
thus can be seen to implement stationarity assumptions.59
Scholars tend to agree that preservationism is a problematic construct for regulations that will be
affected by climate change.60 If climate change undermines baseline assumptions due to climatemediated changes to resources and habitats, preservationist policies may achieve their stated
intentions. These critiques associate preservationism with a lack of flexibility and inability to adapt to
changes of the magnitude expected with climate change.61 In addition, preservationist policies raise
difficult questions of where the baselines should be set.
Transitionalism can be viewed as a successor to preservationism.62 Transitionalism refers to legal
regimes that are designed to manage for change, both procedurally and substantively.63
Transitionalist conservation policy would seek to achieve two overarching principles: use of
management tools (notably, techniques of habitat restoration and enhancement) to support
transitional strategies, and focus on conservation of broader biodiversity goals rather than on
preservation of particular species, purposes, or conditions.64 Transitionalism is thus inherently
forward-looking in that it is designed to enable and encourage transformation and movement.65
Fisheries management reflects both preservationist and transitional elements. From a preservationist
perspective, fisheries management decisions are tightly tied to historical biomass, as estimated in
FMPs.66 The use of historical biomass can be problematic under changing conditions: “if
environmental conditions have changed, that which was virgin biomass in the past will not

resources, where it provides a contrast to exploitation. See Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the
Elusive Great White Whale of Preservationism, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 385-387 (2009) (comparing
exploitive, conservationist, and preservationist norms under the international whaling regime); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of
Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34
HOUS. L. REV. 933, 992-993 (1997) (contrasting preservationism with “resourcism”).
58 Ruhl, supra note 48, at 393.
59 See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 48, at 395 (“if stationarity is dead in conservation science, preservationism is dead in
conservation policy”).
60 Ruhl, supra note 48, at 395; Craig, supra note 44, at 17; Biber & Eagle, supra note 57, at 797-98 (2015) (collecting
sources).
61 Ruhl, supra note 48, at 395; Biber & Eagle, supra note 57, at 797-800 (outlining substantive critiques and proposed
reforms associated with preservationism).
62 Id. at 394-95.
63 Id. at 395-96.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 50 C.F.R. § 600.310 (establishing guidelines for national standard 1, including MSY and status determination criteria);
NAT’L MAR. FISHERIES SERV., DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING OVERFISHING AND OVERFISHED
STATUS 3, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/fisheries_eco/status_of_fisheries/archive/2013/methodology.pdf.
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necessarily be the same as could be achieved in the absence of fishing today.”67 In such cases, stock
status determinations and resulting annual catch limits or rebuilding plans may be unrealistic,
resulting in unexpected management outcomes.68 For example, a stock deemed overfished may not
be capable of recovery69—a situation that arguably may be occurring in the case of Atlantic cod70—
or may recover in a different time period than expected.
On the other hand, some commentators argue that fisheries management is extremely flexible and
responsive to changing conditions, an approach that can be characterized as highly transitionalist. In
particular, Professors Eric Biber and Josh Eagle note that managers can and do rapidly respond to
changing conditions through a variety of discretionary mechanisms, including incorporating new
science, altering optimum yield determinations, and amending stock models used to establish catch
targets.71 Using these and other procedural tools, “the fisheries governance system has managed to
produce thousands of annual management measures for the hundreds of fisheries under
management for nearly forty years.”72 Indeed, they conclude that FMCs had so much flexibility prior
to the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act that their decisions were not successful in producing MSY
from stocks under management.73 Fishermen transitioned among stocks in response to resultant
stock declines.74
The coastal lobster fishery of southern New England is a prime example of a transitionalist
approach to fisheries management.75 Managers of this fishery had known for several years that the

John K. Pinnegar & Georg H. Engelhard, The ‘Shifting Baseline’ Phenomenon: A Global Perspective, 18 REVIEWS IN FISH
BIOL. & FISHERIES 1, 2 (2008)
68 Id. at 1-2 (2008) (“The emergence of precautionary management has resulted in greater emphasis on fisheries
‘reference points’. Chief among these precautionary reference points has been the biomass of the stock relative to
assumed ‘virgin stock size’ (B0). In most fisheries assessments, estimating virgin biomass (B0) depends either on
extrapolating back to well before we began to have reliable data or on taking estimates of annual recruitment and
calculating what virgin biomass these would have produced in the absence of fishing pressure. All such calculations are
highly subjective.” (internal citations omitted)).
69 Szuwalski & Hollowed, supra note 52, at 1299 (discussing “one-way trips” that occur “when a stock has been depleted
to a small fraction of the estimated unfished biomass or its proxy and then it does not recover when fishing pressure is
reduced.”)
70 The connection between cod stocks and climate change is debated in the scientific literature. Keith M. Brander,
Climate change not to blame for cod population decline, 1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 262 (2018) (comparing North Sea and Gulf
of Maine cod stocks to suggest that fishing pressure, not climate change, is causing decline of Gulf of Maine cod); AJ
Pershing et al., Slow adaptation in the face of rapid warming leads to collapse of the Gulf of Maine cod fishery, 350 SCIENCE 809
(2015) (arguing that climate change is primary driver for Gulf of Maine cod decline).
71 Biber & Eagle, supra note 57, at 802-04.
72 Id. at 803.
73 Id. at 808 (“[S]tocks improved as the law became less flexible--i.e., as it imposed greater constraints on the discretion
of management councils and NOAA.”).
74 Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SCIENCE 860 (1998) (tracking changes in species landed by
fishing industry over time).
75 Farady, supra note 51, at 74-76.
67
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stock was failing as a result of environmental drivers and continued fishing pressure.76 By 2013,
ASMFC concluded that its members doubted the stock’s ability to rebuild to historical levels, but
instead of closing the fishery, managers allowed it to continue.77 This decision was based on the
uncertainty that the southern New England lobster stock would recover even with a full
moratorium; instead, it was decided that the best course of action would be instead to allow the
stock to continue to be depleted while the fishermen were transitioned to fishing other stocks.78
Rhode Island has implemented the expected transitional management in the lobster fishery primarily
through a shift to Jonah crab. Jonah crab is an increasingly important species in southern New
England, including Rhode Island, due to increased landings and market value.79 Rhode Island has
limited eligibility for participation in the increasingly important commercial Jonah crab fishery to
fishermen with a lobster trap allocation,80 a step that makes sense due to the similarity of lobster and
crab gear and to allow lobster fishermen to replace lost earnings with increased crab catch. While the
long-term sustainability of this approach is uncertain,81 it embodies the transitionalism concept
through the reservation of an entire stock for fishermen who are participants in a related, declining
fishery.
The decline of the southern New England lobster fishery and transition to Jonah crab can be seen as
an embodiment of transitionalism over preservationism. A preservationist approach would have
placed a moratorium on lobster harvest in order to allow these stocks to recover, and likely would be
required for stocks managed under the MSA. At the federal level, the amendments to the MSA in
1996 and 2007 constrained the procedural flexibility available to FMCs, including through
requirements to determine annual catch limits, deploy accountability measures to prevent
overfishing, and impose rebuilding plans on short timeframes upon a determination that a stock is
overfished.82 Under these provisions, FMCs are more constrained than the ASMFC in
implementation of transitional management approaches.

ASMFC American Lobster Technical Committee, Recruitment Failure in the Southern New England Lobster Stock
(2010).
77 Farady, supra note51, at 84.
78 Id. at 84-85.
79 ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERY MANAGEMENT FOR JONAH CRAB 1 (2015).
80 25-8 R.I. CODE R. § 4:15.5.2(B).
81 The ASMFC developed a FMP for Jonah crab in response to concerns over the sustainability of the rapidly growing
fishery, which targets a species at a lower trophic level than lobster which has a largely unknown life history and
biomass. See ASMFC, INTERSTATE FISHERY MANAGEMENT FOR JONAH CRAB (2015).
82 See Lindsay Walton, Introduction to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL
LAW 65, 67-68 (Randall S. Abate, ed. 2015) (discussing amendments to MSA).
76
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Command and Control
”Command and control” regulatory systems operate by establishing prescriptive standards of
conduct.83 Because these systems are seen as rigid, they may be considered incompatible with
adaptation to changing conditions. This rigidity is one of several criticisms of command-and-control
systems, which are widely seen as problematic in the legal literature.84 Legal scholars have advocated
for a range of reforms for command-and-control frameworks, notably including the use of flexible,
market-driven or self-regulatory mechanisms to increase the efficiency of regulatory systems.85
Legal commentary on fisheries management has been consistent with broader arguments against
command-and-control and advocating for market-driven regulatory systems.86 Commentators
characterize fisheries management as a prototypical command-and-control system because it is
complex and prescriptive.87 Fishing regulations may comprehensively dictate how the fishing
industry operates: when fishing can occur, how much of a given stock can be caught each trip, what
gear or vessels may be used to catch it, when it can be landed, to whom it can be sold, among other
requirements.
Market-driven management systems, such as individual fishing quotas (IFQ) or “catch shares,” have
been presented as an alternative.88 Catch share systems remove certain fisheries regulations—
typically, those related to effort restrictions, such as seasons and trip limits, and allow fishermen
flexibility to catch a certain amount of fish on an annual basis rather than during a short season.
However, these systems do not affect other fisheries regulations, such as stock assessment and yield
determination processes and some gear restrictions (e.g., circle hooks or mesh size requirements to
address bycatch). In this respect, fisheries market-management systems are consistent with other

Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 559-660 (2012) (quoting James E. Krier &
Richard B. Stewart, Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental Law: The Example of Common Law Rules, 1 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13, 15n.3 (1980)) (“Although ‘command and control’ has become widely used short-hand in
contemporary legal circles, it is rarely defined and its meanings and functions have become either submerged or taken
for granted. . . . A 1980 article by James Krier and Richard Stewart provides an early definition of the term: ‘As the
phrase perhaps implies, this regulatory approach typically proceeds by imposing rigid standards of conduct . . . backed
up by sanctions designed to assure full compliance with such standards . . . .’”).
84 Id. at 662-663 (coding concerns as “bureaucracy, coercive, costly, end-of-pipe, ineffective, inefficient, information,
interest group, legalistic, and uniform.”)
85 See id. at 662-668; Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental Regulation to 21st Century
Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. 1 (2017) (arguing for broad shift toward market-based regulatory structures and incentives).
86 Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 393 (1999).
87 Id. at 398-99.
88 Id.; see also NOAA, NOAA CATCH SHARE POLICY (2010),
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/management/catch_shares/about/documents/noaa_cs_policy.pdf.
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legal systems, where “most of the market approaches that have been used in the United States
operate within the standard command-and-control framework.”89
While command-and-control regulatory systems, including fisheries management, have been
criticized, the relationship between these systems and climate resilience have received surprisingly
little attention to date. However, three of the catalogued complaints about command-and-control
systems appear to implicate resilience, including rigidity, “end-of-pipe” approach, and informational
limitations. The remainder of this section assesses each of these critiques in the context of fisheries
management and climate resilience.
2.3.1 Rigidity in Fisheries Management
The rigidity critique of command-and-control systems suggests that regulatory systems based on
complex systems of rules are too rigid and inflexible to effectively govern90—or to adapt to changing
conditions. While fisheries management is undoubtedly complex, legal commentators have noted
that systems of rules are not necessarily inflexible or difficult to change.91 Fisheries management, in
particular, is among the nimblest regulatory systems from both a procedural and a substantive
perspective.92
From a procedural perspective, fisheries managers have demonstrated an ability to effectively
manage within the constraints of federal and state rulemaking requirements. Managers use regulatory
amendments to set new annual measures in every fishery under management, as well as to rapidly
respond to new information when required, such as through adjustment of catch limits.93 In
addition, FMCs have developed framework adjustment processes to enable them to change FMPs
without the need to conduct the multi-year process of developing a new plan amendment.94 While
some management actions, such as full FMP amendment, may require long processes, the evidence
to date does not suggest that the command-and-control structure of fisheries management has
caused procedural rigidity that would undermine response to climate change.95

Daniel H. Cole, Environmental Instrument Choice in a Second-Best World: A Comment on Professor Richards, 10 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 287, 289 (2000) (quoting J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 15 (1998)).
90 Short, supra note 83, at 689 n.281 (collecting articles); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How to Clean up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 940 (1997).
91 Short, supra note 83, at 987; Cole, supra note 89, at 293 n.39 (citing Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy
Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 264 (2000)) (noting that “one of the primary advantages of
hierarchical instruments (i.e., direct regulations) is that they allow rapid adaptation to changes.”).
92 Biber & Eagle, supra note 57, at 802-808.
93 Id. at 802-03 (noting that “in practice the fisheries governance system has managed to produce thousands of annual
management measures for the hundreds of fisheries under management for nearly forty years”).
94 Dan Gourlie, Reeling in Uncertainty: Adapting Marine Fisheries Management to Cope with Climate Effects on Ocean Ecosystems, 47
ENVTL. L. 179, 220-221 (2017) (noting limitations of framework adjustment for rapid response).
95 Lawmakers have expressed concern that a recent Executive Order seeking regulatory repeals may undermine the
rulemaking necessary for federal fisheries management. Letter from Raúl M. Grijalva, Ranking Member, U.S. House of
89

13

Fisheries management structures also provide substantive flexibility that may support resilient
approaches to changing conditions. FMCs and regional entities have broad discretion to set harvest
levels as well as to identify the most appropriate management measures to achieve those levels at the
state and regional levels.96 Managers may not deploy these tools regularly to adapt fisheries
management approaches in practice—for example, regional bodies such as ASMFC may be slow to
reallocate quota from state to state in response to changing conditions, a political judgement that
protects entrenched fishermen and related businesses. However, fisheries managers at both the
federal and regional levels do have sufficient legal authority to change management measures and
yield targets more proactively if they should so choose.
2.3.2 End-of-Pipe Regulation in Fisheries Management
The “end-of-pipe” critique of command-and-control systems is that they mitigate impacts through
regulations instead of establishing systems that empower industries to avoid those impacts in the
first place.97 “End-of-pipe”-style regulations could, in theory, undermine climate adaptation efforts
by preventing industry from adopting new or different technology to adapt to changing conditions.
While commentators have noted that command-and-control systems often contain mechanisms or
incentives allowing creative and novel solutions,98 the “end-of-pipe” critique suggests a shift from
specific technological requirements to market-driven regulations that allow industry to determine
how to achieve required outcomes.99
The “end-of-pipe” critique can be applied primarily to the aspects of fisheries regulations that seek
to avoid negative impacts—notably, bycatch and overfishing. Some bycatch avoidance regulations
work through prescriptive gear limits, such as the mesh size restrictions in the New England
groundfish trawl fishery.100 Other regulations are less prescriptive, such as the limits on incidental
catch of haddock in the northeast herring mid-water trawl fishery.101 Under this system, the herring
Reps. Comm. on Nat’l Res. And Jared Huffman, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Reps. Subcomm, on water, Power,
and Oceans, to President Donald Trump (Feb. 2, 2017) (“We are writing today to express our grave concern over the
executive order . . . requiring federal agencies to, among other things, identify at least two regulations to be repealed
when proposing a new regulation. . . . All fisheries that take place in federal waters require regulatory action to open and
close seasons, set catch limits, modify conservation and management measures, or adjust participation eligibility
requirements. In many cases, multiple regulations must be enacted each year for a single fishery and that is a good thing .
. .”). While this order may affect some types of fisheries rulemakings, it does not apply to actions needed to manage
fisheries on an ongoing basis because they are not “significant.” See, e.g. Atlantic Highly Migratory Species: Atlantic
Bluefin Tuna Fisheries, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,047 (Aug. 17, 2017) (noting inapplicability of Executive Order 13,771 because
temporary closure of tuna fishery is not a significant rulemaking under Executive Order 12,866).
96 Id. at 803-06 (noting legislative changes to reduce discretion).
97 Short, supra note 83, at 690 n.282 (collecting articles).
98 Id. (noting that environmental statutes are based on performance standards, not on the use of specific technologies,
and that regulated entities can adopt a range of approaches to meet those standards).
99 Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 550-51
(2007).
100 50 C.F.R. § 648.80.
101 50 C.F.R. § 648.86(a)(3).
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fishery is constrained once it reaches a maximum level of haddock bycatch.102 Bycatch caps enable
fishermen to avoid bycatch by any means rather than through a single required method—an
approach that heeds “end-of-pipe” critiques. However, the practical experience of such caps can be
difficult—for example, the mid-water herring fishery was essentially closed for months in 2016 after
hitting its cap.103 Climate change may affect bycatch, however regulated, as it changes the
distributions and characteristics of fish stocks. However, these changes may cause particular
challenges in systems such as Atlantic herring, in which fishermen are responsible for avoiding
bycatch rather than relying on set gear restrictions as a safe harbor.
Efforts to avoid overfishing are based on management measures to achieve yield targets.
Historically, management measures employed effort limitations to meet these targets, including
through daily or trip-based possession limits and fishing seasons.104 Market-based management, in
the form of catch share systems, has more recently been employed to offer fishermen more
flexibility in when and where to fish.105 While effort-based and catch-share systems have many
differences, it is not clear that one or the other is better prepared for changing environmental
conditions. Instead, both are ultimately intended to achieve yield targets, which themselves will
change as individual stocks fluctuate. Efforts to shift fisheries management from single-species yield
targets to overall ecosystem health, through “fishery ecosystem plans” or other ecosystem-based
management systems, could have a greater impact by allowing fishermen to alter target stocks within
an ecosystem over time as stocks shift in response to changing conditions.106
2.3.3 Informational Deficits in Fisheries Management
The informational deficit critique of command-and-control systems applies to management under
changing conditions. This critique argues that “regulators lack information held by regulated entities
that is essential to effectively dispatching their jobs. This makes regulation both costly and illinformed.”107 To address informational deficits, command-and-control systems often include
information-gathering or disclosure mechanisms to transfer knowledge from industry to
regulators.108 In the climate change context, informational deficits may be problematic if regulated
See NMFS, Atlantic Herring Fishery: Changes to Haddock Incidental Catch Measures (Sep. 14, 2011) (explaining
system).
103 Laurie Schreiber, Herring v. Haddock in Data Debate, FISHERMAN’S VOICE, Feb. 2016,
http://www.fishermensvoice.com/archives/201602Index.html.
104 NMFS, NOAA Catch Share Policy (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/webdam/download/64669109.
105 Id.
106 See E.K. Pikitch et al., Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management, 305 SCIENCE 346 (2004) (advocating for shift from singlespecies to ecosystem approach).
107 Short, supra note 83, at 691, 691 n.286 (collecting articles); David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach
to Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99
IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2014) (“Command and control regulations will be an important first step to prevent
contamination but cannot address all risks, particularly those for which industry has more knowledge than agencies.”).
108 Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 113 (2015) (identifying typology of strategies for
addressing informational deficits in governance systems).
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entities are aware of changing conditions, but regulators are not. In such cases, decisions may be
tailored to past conditions but suboptimal for the present and future.
Fisheries managers must make decisions in the face of uncertainty about the status and trends of fish
stocks. These decisions are based on data and interpretive models obtained from fishery-dependent
and fishery-independent sources.109 Both federal and regional management are subject to substantive
and procedural limitations on how they apply these data. For example, procedural mechanisms such
as the SSCs are required to ensure that managers deploy scientific information effectively,110 and
substantive requirements like National Standard 2 require the use of the best available scientific
information.111
Rapid changes in marine ecosystems may strain the ability of existing data sources to support
effective management decisions. Fishermen may perceive changes in the abundance and range of
fish populations before these changes are reflected in stock assessments, model outputs, or
management decisions such as state allocations. In such cases, expansion of fishery-dependent data
collection could be one among an array of options for reducing informational deficits and ensuring
that management decisions remain well-matched to actual conditions.
Principled Flexibility
Professor Robin Kundis Craig has proposed “principled flexibility” as the aspirational standard to
which environmental regulations should aspire in an age of climate change. She defines this
construct to mean that:
both the law and regulators (1) distinguish in legally significant ways uncontrollable climate
change impacts from controllable anthropogenic impacts on species, resources, and
ecosystems that can and should be actively managed and regulated, and (2) implement
consistent principles for an overall climate change adaptation strategy, even though the
application of those principles in particular locations in response to specific climate change
impacts will necessarily encompass a broad and creative range of adaptation decisions and
actions.112
Professor Craig identifies promotion of principled flexibility in natural resource management as one
of five principles for climate adaptation. This approach includes flexibility in management when
facing climate-mediated changes. For example, climate change may increase water temperature,
resulting in degradation of water quality for fish and triggering restrictions on pollution in order to
return the watercourse to its prior state.113 A principled flexibility approach would recognize that
PATRICK KILDUFF ET AL., ASMFC, GUIDE TO FISHERIES SCIENCE AND STOCK ASSESSMENTS 7-14 (Tina L. Berger,
ed. 2009) (discussing types and uses of data sources).
110 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(1)(A).
111 Id. § 1851(a)(2).
112 Craig, supra note 44, at 17-18.
113 Id. at 64.
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imposition of restrictions will not solve the problem and allow a “climate adaptation” exemption to
avoid inefficiency and wasted effort—provided that the responsible agency can demonstrate the
impossibility of accomplishing its regulatory mandate.114 Flexibility to implement adaptive
management mechanisms is also needed, including the ability to make regular changes in regulations
in response to changing conditions.115 Substantively, decisions would be made on a “no regrets”
basis that seeks to be beneficial even if projected changes do not occur as expected.116
Fisheries management laws and regulations incorporate a variety of mechanisms consistent with
principled flexibility. For example, the minimum stock size threshold used to determine overfished
status can be informed by life history fluctuations or “other considerations.”117 The guidelines for
National Standard 2 require inclusion of “the relevant range of scientific disciplines” and
acknowledgement of information gaps and identification of assumptions and uncertainty.118
Similarly, National Standard 6 requires that conservation and management measures must account
for variation in fisheries, and its associated guidelines call for an adequate buffer for conservation to
avoid overfishing—a “no regrets” policy.119 The administrative functioning of fisheries management
is also highly adaptive, as regulations to accomplish critical tasks (e.g., season openers and closures,
yield target determinations) are issued at least annually. Further, the practical experience with the
southern New England lobster fishery suggests that policy makers have substantial discretion to
allow reductions in biomass of stocks impacted by climate change.
In many respects, then, fisheries management appears consistent with principled flexibility—
although managers have rarely explicitly distinguished the influences of climate change from
anthropogenic influences. This may be starting to change, however. For example, NOAA Fisheries
has developed a climate science strategy intended in part to ensure compliance with the best
available science mandate under the MSA—an important step towards identification of controllable
impacts and adaptation principles.120
These examples suggest that fisheries management includes substantial flexibility, but that flexibility
is associated only in limited circumstances with the explicit, legally-significant constraints and climate
strategies needed for it to be considered “principled flexibility” as defined by Professor Craig.

Id.
Id. at 66.
116 Id.
117 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(e)(2)(ii)(B). See also Craig, supra note 44, at 46-48 (suggesting that yield criteria, and in particular
MSY, should be converted to a standard that is “clearly sustainable even under climate change.”).
118 16 U.S.C. § 1851; 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(a).
119 16 U.S.C. § 1851; 50 C.F.R. § 600.335.
120 NOAA, NOAA Fisheries Climate Science Strategy, Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO-155 (Jason S. Link et al.,
eds., 2015).
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3

Black Sea Bass: Management of a Changing Fishery

Consideration of the ability of fisheries management systems to adapt to changing conditions can be
illustrated through a case study applying theoretical considerations to a specific context. This section
applies the discussion in the prior section to the Atlantic black sea bass fishery—a complex fishery
that is experiencing rapid change.
Fishery Overview
The black sea bass (Centropristis striata) is a bottom-dwelling, predatory fish often found near reefs
and sheltered bottom areas.121 The fish can grow up to be around two feet in length and may live for
fifteen to twenty years.122 Adults generally migrate north and inshore to follow warming water
temperatures in the spring and then travel back south and offshore during the fall.123
Black sea bass is a popular species that is harvested by a variety of gear types in both coastal and
offshore waters across the entire Atlantic coast.124 Commercially, otter trawl gear accounts for 65%
of catch, while fish pots and traps, lobster traps, hand lines, and other gear are also used.125 Because
the species crosses jurisdictional lines, the MAFMC and the ASMFC cooperatively manage the black
sea bass fishery from North Carolina to Canada as a single stock under Amendment 9 of the
Summer Flounder, Scup and Black Sea Bass FMP, as amended, which MAFMC created in
cooperation with NEFMC, the South Atlantic FMC, and NMFS.126 NMFS has issued regulations to
implement the FMP.127
Over the past few years, the black sea bass stock has been shifting northwards in correlation with
rising ocean temperatures.128 For example, over thirty percent of the total catch of black sea bass in
both 2016 and 2017 was caught in sector 616, which is located directly east of the coast of New
Jersey and south of Long Island. 129 This catch represents a substantial increase from 2014 and 2015,
when sector 616 was only responsible for sixteen percent and thirteen percent, respectively, of the
Maryland Department of Natural Resources, Black Sea Bass, http://dnr.maryland.gov/fisheries/Pages/FishFacts.aspx?fishname=Black%20Sea%20Bass.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 MAFMC, BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY INFORMATION DOCUMENT 4 (2017).
125 Id.
126 See MAFMC, Fishery Management Plan and Amendments: Summer Flounder, Scup, Black Sea Bass,
http://www.mafmc.org/fisheries/fmp/sf-s-bsb.
127 50 C.F.R. §§ 648.140 – 648.149.
128 MAFMC, Black Sea Bass Fishery Information Document (2017).
http://www.mafmc.org/s/BSB_fishery_info_doc2017.pdf.
129 MAFMC, Black Sea Bass Fishery Information Document (2016),
http://www.mafmc.org/s/BSB_fishery_info_doc2016.pdf; MAFMC, Black Sea Bass Fishery Information Document
(2017), http://www.mafmc.org/s/BSB_fishery_info_doc2017.pdf. Sector 616 was responsible for most of the black sea
bass landings in both 2016 and 2017. In 2016 sector 616 was responsible for roughly thirty-five percent of black sea bass
landings, and in 2017 it was responsible for thirty-four percent of landings. Id.
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total catch.130 The increases in northerly sectors contrast against declines in more southerly areas.
Similarly, state contributions to black sea bass recreational landings have shifted northwards.131 For
example, New Jersey contributed 38 percent of recreational landings in 2012, but only 12 percent in
2016.132 Conversely, Connecticut landings increased from six percent in 2012 to 17 percent in
2016.133 This trend has led to “extremely high availability” of fish in northern states, which is
contributing to recreational quota overages “despite very restrictive management measures”134 and
contributing to high levels of discard in commercial fisheries.135
Black sea bass has historically been considered a “data-poor stock,” and several models for mapping
the population have been rejected due to the uncertain nature of the survey data, resulting in calls
for additional fishery-independent surveys to be conducted in order to more accurately survey the
fish stocks.136 A benchmark stock assessment was completed and reviewed in 2016 by the Stock
Assessment Review Committee, resulting in changes to the stock assessment model and
development of new biological reference points for the species.137
In 2017, the MAFMC SSC accepted the revised stock assessment model for use in setting
overfishing limits for black sea bass management.138 The stock assessment indicates that the stock is
neither overfished nor undergoing overfishing.139 The model estimates that spawning stock
biomass—the threshold indicator for minimum stock size, is 2.3 times greater than the level at MSY,
and fishing mortality (0.27) was less than the threshold mortality for MSY (0.36).140 Both biomass
and fishing mortality levels indicate that the stock is substantially healthier than in previous years,
when biomass at times fell below the minimum stock size threshold (particularly prior to federal
management).141

MAFMC, Black Sea Bass Advisory Panel Information Document (2014), http://www.mafmc.org/s/BSB-AP-FPRInfo-Doc-June-2014-s9ie.pdf; MAFMC, Black Sea Bass Fishery Information Document (2015),
http://www.mafmc.org/s/BSB_fishery_info_doc2015_final-r13c.pdf.
131 MAFMC, BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY INFORMATION DOCUMENT (2017); MAFMC, BLACK SEA BASS ADVISORY
PANEL INFORMATION DOCUMENT (2014). Recreational landings are used because they are likely to be geographically
linked with the location where fish are caught.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 ASMFC, ADDENDUM XXVII TO THE SUMMER FLOUNDER, SCUP, AND BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY MANAGEMENT
PLAN § 2.1.2 (2016).
135 Alex Kuffner, Front Line of Climate Change: Black Sea Bass Surge off R.I., PROVIDENCE J., Jul. 15, 2018,
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20180715/front-line-of-climate-change-black-sea-bass-surge-off-ri.
136 Gary Shepherd, Black Sea Bass, in NORTHEAST DATA POOR STOCKS WORKING GROUP REPORT
423, 434 (2008), https://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd0902/blackSeaBass/bsbText.pdf.
137 MAFMC, BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY INFORMATION DOCUMENT (2017).
138 Memorandum from Michael Luisi, MAFMC Chairman, to John Boreman, Chair, MAFMC SSC (Jan. 27, 2017),
http://www.mafmc.org/s/January-2017-SSC-Report.pdf.
139 MAFMC, BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY INFORMATION DOCUMENT (2017).
140 Id. at 2.
141 Id. at 2-3.
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The fishery management plan divides the black sea bass stock between the recreational fishery and
the commercial fishery; the recreational fishery receives 51% of the total quota and the commercial
fishery receives 49%.142 Under this formula for the year 2017, 4.12 million pounds of black sea bass
was allocated to the commercial fishery and 4.29 million pounds was allocated to the recreational
fishery.143 These quota allocations incorporate a buffer, so that they are less than the annual catch
limits for both the commercial and the recreational sectors.144 In past years, commercial sector
landings have closely approximated quota, while recreational landings have routinely exceeded
quota, including landings of 184% of quota in 2016.145
The commercial black sea bass quota is divided among the states on a state-by-state basis.146 The
ASMFC established these state allocations in 2002, during the development of Amendment 13 to
the FMP, to allocate fishing by state under the new federal coastwide quota system, which was
intended in part to avoid possible inequities as the landings shifted northwards.147 The ASMFC
renewed these state allocations in 2004 for the years 2005-07.148 It then renewed them without
expiration in 2007,149 and the original allocation percentages remain in effect today.
Under the state allocation system, each state is responsible for managing its own commercial fishery,
primarily through input controls such as time and area closures and license limitation schemes.150
States must also comply with coastwide restrictions. Coastwide specifications for the commercial
fishery include minimum commercial size, minimum net mesh size, and escape vent size and
placement on traps and pots.151 Coastwide recreational specifications include minimum size,
possession limit, and season restrictions, which since 2011 have been set separately for the northern

Id.
MAFMC, Black Sea Bass Fishery Information Document (2017).
144 Id. at 5.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 MAFMC & ASMFC, AMENDMENT 13 TO THE SUMMER FLOUNDER, SCUP, AND BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN, VOL. 1 15 (2002) (“After considerable debate, the Commission adopted allocation percentages for
20013 and 2004 that represented a compromise between the allocation percentages associated with [] various base
periods . . . [1988-97 and 1993-97] and the current fishing patterns, i.e. 2001 landings”). ASMFC, ADDENDUM XIX TO
THE SUMMER FLOUNDER, SCUP, AND BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN (2007).
148 ASMFC, ADDENDUM XII TO THE SUMMER FLOUNDER, SCUP, AND BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN
(2004).
149 ASMFC, ADDENDUM XIX TO THE SUMMER FLOUNDER, SCUP, AND BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN
(2007).
150 Id. (“Under this program, states have the responsibility of managing their quota for the greatest benefit of the
commercial black sea bass industry in their state. States designed allocation systems based on state specific landing
patterns using possession limits and seasons to ensure a continuous and steady supply of product over the season for
producers and/or a fair and equitable distribution of black sea bass to all fishermen who have traditionally landed black
sea bass in their state.”).
151 50 C.F.R. § 648.144.
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and southern states in order to constrain recreational catch in areas where sea bass are highly
available and quota overages occurring.152
The Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM) manages commercial and
recreational fisheries in the state, including for black sea bass.153 Rhode Island receives 11 percent of
the commercial black sea bass allocation, which totaled approximately 453,200 pounds in 2017.154
Rhode Island requires its commercial fishermen to obtain a Restricted Finfish endorsement.155
Endorsements are limited based on a “rotating door” licensing system with a 1:1 exit/entry ratio.
Under this system, one new license with a restricted finfish endorsement is available for every one
license with a restricted finfish endorsement that is not renewed.156 The state regulations split the
year into six seasons, each with its own catch limit.157 For example, the January 1 to April 30 season
is allocated twenty-five percent of the state’s quota, and fishermen are allowed to land 750 pounds
of black sea bass per week during this period.158 The fishery is closed from August 1 until September
14.159 RIDEM regulations also implement the required gear requirements and minimum size limits—
fifteen inches for recreational and eleven inches for commercial, as well as daily or weekly
possession limits that vary by season.160
Climate Change Impacts on the Black Sea Bass Fishery
The black sea bass fishery is changing rapidly along with changing environmental conditions. As a
result, it is a useful case study to illustrate how the theories of climate adaptation discussed in section
2 may play out in practice. This section provides evaluates the fishery on each of the adaptation
theories.
3.2.1 Stationarity
The black sea bass fishery exhibits stationarity primarily in a mismatch between the location of the
stock and its managers. While understanding of the fishery has improved as the stock has shifted
northwards, that range shift has not affected responsibility for management or allocations of fishing
rights on a state level.

ASMFC, ADDENDUM XXVII TO THE SUMMER FLOUNDER, SCUP, AND BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY MANAGEMENT
PLAN (2016); ASMFC, ADDENDUM XXI TO THE SUMMER FLOUNDER, SCUP, AND BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (2011) (establishing regional restriction system).
153 R.I. Admin. Code 25-8-4:3.14.
154 MAFMC, BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY INFORMATION DOCUMENT (2017).
155 The Restricted Finfish endorsement includes: scup, summer flounder, tautog, striped bass, and black sea bass. NonRestricted Finfish include all species of finfish and squid available for commercial harvest except the five species
specified in the restricted finfish endorsement category. 25 R.I. ADMIN. CODE 8-21:6.1.1(a)(vi).
156 R.I. Admin. Code 25-8-21:6.1.10 (2017).
157 R.I. Admin. Code 25-8-4:3.14.2(B) (2017).
158 R.I. Admin. Code 25-8-4:3.14.2(B)(1) (2017).
159 R.I. Admin. Code 25-8-4:3.14.2(B)(4) (2017).
160 Id.
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From a fishery science perspective, the shifting stock range and high levels of availability noted in
the northern states suggests that the stock may have shifted outside of its historic geographic
envelope of variability. This potential violation of stationarity conditions does not appear to have led
to inadequate or unrealistic stock models, however, due to continued scientific investment. As the
black sea bass has long been considered a data-poor stock, managers have worked to better
understand the stock and to develop realistic stock assessment models, even as the stock has been
changing. As the most recent model was adopted within the last calendar year,161 it is likely that it
captures the dynamic movement of the stock since 2002. Moreover, this model produced new status
determination criteria,162 which may be effectively matched to conditions in effect when the model
was developed.
While investments in black sea bass modeling may avoid stationarity issues from a scientific
perspective, the management structure for the species illustrates procedural stationarity at both
federal and regional levels. The federal Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Council (MAFMC) is responsible for
management of the federal black sea bass fishery and FMP, but a substantial portion of the stock
under federal management now exists in states that are not members of the MAFMC and therefore
not represented by council members with voting powers.163 For example, Rhode Island is home to
an increasing share of the Black Sea Bass fishery, but is a voting member only of the NEFMC. While
the NEFMC is consulted on issues related to the black sea bass FMP, consultation is not equivalent
to direct management responsibility. This mismatch is similar to a range shift affecting loligo squid,
which gave rise to efforts (unsuccessful to date) to add Rhode Island to the MAFMC.164
Regional black sea bass management does not create a geographic mismatch between the regulators
and stock because all states in the black sea bass range are ASMFC members. However, the ASMFC
has not updated or changed its state quota allocations since they were initially negotiated in 2002,
based on historical harvest as far back as 1988.165 While the creation of set state allocations was
intended to avoid inequity as the stock shifted northward,166 continuation of the initial allocations
over such a long period suggests that those allocations are not linked to the evolving geographic
range and prevalence of the species. This static allocation may avoid economic dislocation to the
industry in southerly states where stocks are declining, but it may conversely result in higher bycatch
and related discard mortality—and a missed economic opportunity for fishers—in northerly states
with lower allocations but larger stocks.
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3.2.2 Preservationism/Transitionalism
As described in the previous section, the recent adoption of a new stock assessment model and
status determination criteria suggest that managers are attempting to model the black sea bass stock
as it exists today, rather than to anchor it in a past condition. In this respect, its status as a data-poor
stock may provide an advantage to managers. Future decisions about deployment and further
evolution of the model and related criteria will determine whether the system seeks to preserve
current conditions or continues to evolve with the changing stock dynamics.
The fishery does exhibit preservationism in how quota is allocated by the ASMFC. Black sea bass
state quota allocations have been unchanged for a long period and do not appear to be transitioning
with the northward expansion of the stock, instead maintaining allocations based on past landings.167
As the ASMFC has eliminated the requirement to reconsider its black sea bass state allocations over
time,168 it appears to have adopted a preservationist posture with regard to the economic basis of the
fishing industry rather than allowing harvest to transition with shifting stock geography. This
approach contrasts with hypothetical transitionalist mechanisms, such as policies that automatically
shift allocations based on stock geography, as identified by scientific stock assessment.
3.2.3 Command and Control
Black sea bass management is largely managed through command-and-control input controls, such
as gear requirements, minimum size and possession limits, and complex seasons. These elements are
used to manage allocations to commercial and recreational sectors that are determined by managers
and do not change from year to year.169 However, as for other fisheries, the status determination
criteria, including total allowable landings, are determined based on evolving fishery models.170 Thus,
the black sea bass is typical of other fisheries in that it is a complex system that combines both rigid
command-and-control elements and flexible, adaptive mechanisms.
The input controls used to manage black sea bass catch, as implemented both through NOAA and
state regulations, are typical “end-of-pipe” elements that do appear to limit the ability of the industry
to adapt to climate change. For example, the regulations for pot construction require two escape
vents, bound together with one of four types of biodegradable fasteners, with different stipulated
dimensions (at least 2” x 2” if square, 2.5” in diameter if circular, and 1-3/8” X 5-3/4” if
rectangular).171 These and other, similarly-specific gear restrictions are used in lieu of market-based
mechanisms, such as bycatch caps, and do not provide incentives for fishermen in high-availability,
low-quota areas to avoid catch. Similarly, permitting limitations, such as Rhode Island’s nonMAFMC & ASMFC, supra note 147.
ASMFC, ADDENDUM XIX TO THE SUMMER FLOUNDER, SCUP, AND BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN
(2007).
169 MAFMC, BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY INFORMATION DOCUMENT (2017) (noting 51% - 49% allocations to recreational
and commercial sectors).
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transferable endorsement172 and the state-by-state quota system, also limit the ability of black sea
bass fishermen to trade fishing rights as the stock moves geographically. As a result, fishermen in
high-availability areas are limited in their ability to access a newly-abundant resource.
Black sea bass management is rigid in some respects—notably, through its state quota allocations—
but it does enable modification of technological input controls through flexibility mechanisms.
Specifically, managers are authorized to modify conservation and management measures through an
abbreviated framework adjustment process adopted under Amendment 12 to the black sea bass
FMP.173 The framework adjustment process enables managers to add and modify other management
measures without the need for a full FMP amendment174—a process that has been used nine times
to date since 1999.175 ASMFC, though not its federal counterpart, can also issue addenda to alter
stock management provisions applicable in state waters—an option used 27 times to date for black
sea bass.176
Finally, the black sea bass fishery management appears to effectively be addressing its informational
deficits. While historically a data-poor fishery, the fishery has adopted a new stock assessment model
and associated status determination criteria, as previously discussed. The fishery also incorporates
buffers to account for uncertainty in information.177 For the 2017 season, for example, the
overfishing limit was set at 12.05 million pounds, whereas the acceptable biological catch was set at a
combined 10.47 million pounds.178 This buffer protects the stock from becoming depleted should
management assumptions prove to be incorrect.
3.2.4 Principled Flexibility
The black sea bass fisheries management has not adopted explicit provisions to distinguish between
controllable and uncontrollable change in the fishery or adopted management principles to guide its
decisions in adapting to those changes. As a result, the elements of black sea bass management that
embody principled flexibility do so implicitly, such as through incorporation of buffers and
incorporation of climate science into stock assessment models. Managers recognized in 2002 that
the stock was shifting northwards when it established its state allocations,179 but it has not addressed
continuing shifts since that time—a contrast to other fisheries, such as summer flounder, which has
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shifted more dramatically as a consequence of a successful rebuilding process.180 Similar
consideration of the effects of changing stock dynamics would be needed to fully incorporate
principled flexibility concepts into black sea bass fishery management.
4

Conclusion

Fisheries are changing over time due to climate change in ways that may strain federal and regional
management systems. Legal theorists have considered how climate change may affect regulatory
systems and have suggested several ways in which laws and regulations may not be capable of
adapting to changing circumstances and how they may be able to do so more effectively. They have
argued that legal frameworks are based on an assumption that conditions vary within an envelope
that can be assessed from historical conditions, but that climate change is creating change that has
no analogue in past experience. They similarly argue that legal frameworks are based on the idea of
preserving the past in perpetuity rather than allowing the transitions that will be needed as
conditions change. Third, they argue that command-and-control systems are not adaptable because
they are rigid, focused on specific technology, and created without sufficient information. Finally,
when they do adapt, those adaptations are not based on considered policy guidance.
This paper has evaluated whether and how federal and regional fisheries legal frameworks reflect
each of these criticisms. As other commentators have noted, domestic fisheries management is a
complex system that incorporates adaptive management in some ways while in others is linked to
historical baselines and models. Close consideration of specific procedural and substantive aspects
of fisheries legal frameworks is therefore needed to understand whether and how they enable
adaptive management in the face of climate change.
Consideration of how legal frameworks are implemented in the context of particular fisheries is
important to determine the adaptive capacity of fisheries management in practice. As the black sea
bass fishery illustrates, regional and federal fisheries management structures are adapting to climaterelated changes through enhanced stock assessment models and status determination criteria.
However, additional development and evolution, such as development of mechanisms for
ASMFC, ADDENDUM XXVII TO THE SUMMER FLOUNDER, SCUP, BLACK SEA BASS FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN 23 (2016) (“The interim solution of state-by-state conservation equivalency based on estimated state harvests in 1998 was
successful initially in mitigating the disparity in conservation burden among states, but the approach is increasingly being
viewed as an inadequate long-term solution given recent changes in resource status and fishery performance. Seventeen
years have passed since 1998. Even if the allocations were perfectly equitable when adopted over a decade ago, they are
now likely out of synch given the substantial variation in stock dynamics that has occurred since then. Over the many
years since Amendment 2 was first implemented, the summer flounder spawning stock biomass has increased
approximately six-fold, and the number of age classes has increased from 2-3 to 7 or more. These changes have led to
geographic shifts in the distribution of the resource (As the stock has rebuilt, its range has expanded). Climate change
may also be contributing to shifts in migratory patterns, spatially and temporally. Taken together, these changing
conditions have altered the dynamics regarding the challenge of maintaining balance in equivalent conservation burden
across the management unit.”).
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recalibration of management responsibility and state landings allocations, will be needed for the
fishery to meet the climate challenge. Proactive management and legal development would be
required for black sea bass management—and fisheries management more broadly—to fully
embody the principled flexibility approach and maximize climate resilience.

26

